The United States is weighing a plan to curb Iran’s nuclear program by negotiating the surrender of a cache of highly enriched uranium. Officials say the stockpile is large and edging close to weapons-grade. Talks would aim to remove or neutralize the material to reduce the risk of a rapid dash to a bomb.
“The U.S. estimates that Iran possesses nearly 1,000 pounds of highly-enriched uranium. It’s not quite enriched to weapons-grade, but it’s not far off.”
The discussions center on how to move, dilute, or convert the stockpile. Scott Roecker, vice president of the Nuclear Materials Security Program at the Nuclear Threat Initiative, weighed in on what a workable deal might require.
How Iran Reached This Point
Iran’s nuclear program has expanded in fits and starts over two decades. In 2015, Tehran agreed to strict limits under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA. The deal capped enrichment at low levels and slashed the size of Iran’s stockpile.
After the U.S. withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018, Iran eased past those caps. It began enriching at higher levels and installing more advanced centrifuges. International inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) still report on key sites, though access has tightened at times.
Highly enriched uranium can be used for research reactors and naval fuel, but it also shortens the time needed to reach weapons-grade. Weapons-grade is about 90 percent enrichment. Any build-up of higher-purity material alarms nonproliferation experts because it reduces warning time.
What a Deal Could Look Like
Negotiators have several technical options. These steps have precedent in past agreements and can be combined to reduce risk quickly.
- Ship the stockpile abroad for storage or reprocessing under foreign and IAEA control.
- Blend it down to low-enriched uranium that is unsuitable for weapons.
- Convert it into fuel for civilian reactors, which is harder to reconvert.
Any plan would need clear timelines and sequencing. Iran would likely expect relief from economic sanctions and assurances against future reversals. The U.S. would push for rapid moves that increase “breakout time,” the period Iran would need to produce weapons-grade fuel if it chose to do so.
Roecker’s program at the Nuclear Threat Initiative focuses on securing nuclear materials worldwide. Experts in his field often stress two pillars: physical removal of risky stockpiles and strong verification to confirm compliance.
Verification and Enforcement
Verification would almost certainly run through the IAEA. Inspectors could oversee packaging, transport, or blending operations. Continuous monitoring and seals would track every kilogram from start to finish.
Enforcement is the other half. A phased approach could link each step Iran takes to measured sanctions relief. Snapback penalties could return if data or inspections show violations. This structure aims to reward progress while guarding against backsliding.
Weighing the Risks and Trade-offs
The core risk is time. The longer highly enriched uranium remains in-country, the shorter the path to a bomb should leaders choose that route. Removing or downgrading it lengthens that path.
There are political risks, too. Iranian leaders face domestic pressure to show dignity and economic relief. U.S. leaders face skepticism about Tehran’s intentions. Both sides want verifiable results that stand up to critics at home.
“How would that even work?”
Past deals offer clues. Under the 2015 accord, Iran accepted strict caps and more intrusive inspections. In return, it gained access to international markets. While that agreement later unraveled, it showed that technical steps and diplomacy can slow the program when both sides commit.
What to Watch Next
The material’s enrichment level matters. If purity rises closer to weapons-grade, options narrow and urgency grows. The size and form of the stockpile also shape the plan. Powder, gas, or fuel each require different handling and oversight.
Regional security is another factor. Gulf states and Israel will track any deal for signs it reduces risk. Russia and China, which engage with Iran’s nuclear and energy sectors, may influence logistics for removal or conversion.
For now, the focus is on a narrow, testable goal: remove or neutralize the most dangerous material and prove it through inspections. If that succeeds, broader talks on enrichment limits and monitoring could follow.
The next phase will hinge on whether Washington and Tehran can match steps on sanctions and stockpile reduction. If they can, the immediate risk falls and inspectors gain time. If they cannot, the standoff deepens and the danger grows.
